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ABSTRACT 
During an undergraduate college career, an accounting major devotes a great part of his or her 
time to learning how publicly traded businesses prepare financial statements in compliance 
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and federal securities laws. These 
accounting principles, standards, and procedures are ultimately enforced by the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to protect investors, uphold fair markets, and 
promote public trust in the capital market system. To fulfill its mission, the SEC Division of 
Enforcement conducts investigations into possible violations of the federal securities laws and 
administers enforcement actions. Naturally, SEC investigations and the anticipation of 
potential enforcement actions have an impact on stock prices and shareholder wealth when 
they become public knowledge. This capstone research project applies an event study 
methodology commonly used in finance and accounting research to examine the timing and 
magnitude of the impact of 51 financial reporting-related SEC enforcement releases from 
April 2014 through March 2017. Specifically, the statistical methodology is applied to assess 
the shareholder response with regard to the company targeted, its main competitor, and the 
nature of the violation. On average, the targeted companies, particularly those with relatively 
small market capitalizations, earned highly statistically significant negative abnormal returns.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
During a typical undergraduate college career as an accounting major, students learn about the 
accounting principles, standards, and procedures that corporations use to prepare their 
financial statements in compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
and federal securities laws. In other words, students learn how ethical, transparent 
corporations follow the rules. Despite their training, it is difficult for accounting majors to 
prepare adequately for a dynamic economic and regulatory environment where financial 
reporting and adherence to GAAP are more convoluted, fluid, and consequential. This 
traditional research thesis seeks to determine the real-world stakes of financial reporting in 
today’s business context by studying the impact of recent Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) financial reporting probes on shareholder wealth. The following research 
questions outline the scope of this inquiry.  
 
Research Questions 
1. What is the impact of a financial reporting-related SEC investigation on the stock 
price of the targeted company? (Timing, Direction, and Magnitude) 
2. How do shareholders of an industry competitor respond? 
3. What common violations has the SEC exposed in recent years and does the nature of 




This literature review explores how publicly traded business entities have violated the 
financial reporting rules in recent history and what the consequences are for stakeholders. 
Specifically, this review centers on the impact that U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) financial reporting-related investigations and enforcement actions have on shareholder 
wealth at the wayward firms and how the process pertains to the effective functioning of a 
capital market system.  
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Accurate financial reporting is fundamental to the effective functioning of our market system. 
Financial reporting fraud and even erroneous misstatements can cost investors and other 
stakeholders money. According to the “Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases” page 
on the SEC website, the number of enforcement actions brought by the commission is 
increasing again, particularly those relating to financial reporting. The increases come as the 
agency returns its focus to alleged financial reporting and disclosure problems that might have 
gone unpunished during the financial crisis. (This study was performed toward the end of the 
Obama administration’s period in office, a period in which regulatory compliance and 
enforcement were emphasized. After the transfer of power to the Trump administration, there 
is substantial doubt that the government will continue its support of robust SEC regulatory 
efforts; therefore, the number of enforcement actions brought by the commission will likely 
decrease in number). It is important to note that the new cases are on a smaller scale and 
typically involve conduct that is far less egregious than the notorious accounting scandals of 
the early 2000’s. This does not mean, however, that the misstatements are not important. 
 
Before reviewing the literature concerning Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement 
actions and consequences for financial misreporting, it is useful to understand how SEC 
investigations begin and how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has impacted corporate 
financial reporting. Feroz, Park, and Pastena (1991), publishing research in the Journal of 
Accounting Research, provide a clear outline of the common leads that launch investigations. 
The authors explain that, in addition to market surveillance programs connected to prominent 
stock exchanges and ongoing SEC report analysis, “public complaints, tips, referrals from 
other law enforcement agencies, and financial press information” are resources used to start 
informal investigations (110-111). Although some leads may seem incriminating from the 
beginning, the SEC does not normally inform the subject or the public during the early stages 
of inquiry. This provides the commission with time and space to gather information and 
decide whether a more formal investigation is necessary. It also protects innocent companies 
from the adverse financial consequences of SEC disclosures and actions, as discussed in the 
subsequent pages of this paper. Recent research by Rebecca Files (2012) augments the 
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literature regarding the SEC’s Enforcement Division and their enforcement process. The 
Enforcement Division oversees the enforcement process and enforcement actions, hereafter 
referred to as Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER). Files notes: “The 
enforcement process can be triggered by various events, including the voluntary 
announcement of misconduct by the company, the delayed filing of an SEC report, the firing 
of an auditor, or routine reviews by the SEC.” Files explains that if a formal investigation was 
deemed necessary and subsequently performed (which can take months and even years), “the 
SEC chooses between two possible paths of actions: (1) stop the investigation and take no 
action, or (2) issue a formal enforcement action against the respondent(s).” These AAER’s 
can result in monetary fines or disgorgement of gains for corporations or non-monetary 
penalties and bars from serving in financial services for auditors, among other punishments. 
 
It is evident that new AAER’s are on a smaller scale and typically involve conduct that is far 
less egregious than the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals, where financial fraud 
rather than misstatements resulted in enormous overvaluations and spectacular stock market 
collapses. This development is in part the result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). 
Following the aforementioned scandals, public outrage evolved into investor dismay and a 
pervasive skepticism throughout society; the public had doubts about the credibility of the 
system of corporate financial reporting. The legislation and regulation enacted in response, 
namely SOX, were measures taken to improve corporate governance by holding executives 
accountable and to re-instill trust in the market system. This reaction resembles how the 
creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934, as part of the Securities 
Exchange Act, was designed to restore the public’s faith in capital markets and renew 
economic prosperity during the Great Depression. Specifically, the purpose of the SOX Act is 
to “protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made 
pursuant to the securities laws.” Li, Pincus, and Rego (2008), publishing their research in The 
Journal of Law and Economics, note that President George W. Bush pronounced the contents 
of SOX as the “most far-reaching reforms of American business practices” since the Great 
Depression. However, one must also be aware, as mentioned by Eccles, Grant, and Van Riel’s 
article in Long Range Planning, that SOX has been controversial.  
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Eccles, Grant, and Van Riel (2006) outline the main criticisms of the regulatory measures 
enacted in the early 2000’s. The most obvious criticism is the added costs associated with 
increased compliance efforts. A more subtle criticism involves shareholder wealth. Opponents 
argue that SOX “has made management and boards averse to taking the kind of intelligent 
risks that are necessary to create value for shareholders” (Eccles, Grant, and Van Riel). A 
CFO Executive Board survey from 2006 cited by Eccles, et al. reveals that seventy percent of 
global companies “had delayed new product introductions, postponed or cancelled 
acquisitions, or shelved process improvements” because of the costs (time and resources) 
associated with increased accounting discipline. SOX, therefore, has been a significant factor 
in the increased relevance of and demand for thorough external audits, but many large 
corporations lobby against these additional, comprehensive regulatory measures.  
 
The federal securities laws, GAAP, and the SEC Division of Enforcement cannot prevent nor 
detect all business fraud. The temptation to manipulate earnings – disguising losses and 
inflating gains – to maximize stock prices has and will continue to be present and 
consequential in a capital market system. One can look as far back as the speculative bubble 
in Great Britain during the early eighteenth century having its origins in South Sea 
Company’s intentional deceit of investors. Fast forward nearly three-hundred years to the 
downfall of companies like Enron, and the rapid stock market rises and sudden collapses look 
all too familiar. As evidenced by AAER’s levied by the SEC, companies are regularly 
penalized for bribery and foreign corrupt practices, deficiencies in internal control over 
financial reporting, general improper accounting practices resulting in misstatements, and 
“earnings management” (overstating revenue, understating expenses, and both). In a society 
that sensationalizes quarterly – short-term – earnings reports, earnings management may 
momentarily maximize shareholder wealth, but this financial misrepresentation distorts the 
allocation of resources and has a lasting impact on a firm’s performance and survivability. 
 
Firms cited in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s AAERs experience negative capital 
market consequences when the action becomes public knowledge. In addition, these firms are 
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more likely to fail in the long-run. Researchers exploring AAERs and consequences of 
earnings manipulation often refer to the pioneering work by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney in 
1996 and Feroz, Park, and Pastena in 1991. Dechow et al. quantified the average stock drop 
that occurs on the date that SEC investigations become public knowledge – the date the 
probes are disclosed in financial reports, press releases, or the media. The sample consisted of 
92 firms that had allegedly violated GAAP between April 1982 and December 1992. The 
stock price of these firms declined by 9 percent on the announcement date. This is comparable 
to the -7.5% abnormal return on the AAER announcement date recorded by Feroz et al. in 
1991. In addition to a loss of shareholder wealth for the wayward firms, the cost of capital 
“increases substantially” (Dechow et al.). Although fundamental to understanding immediate 
impacts of SEC probes into financial reporting irregularities, this research did not look 
beyond a trading-week window and, as it relates to this capstone research project, it requires 
an update given the significant changes in the securities and compliance environment since 
the turn of the new millennium and, indeed, since the Great Recession.  
 
Later research conducted by Feroz (extending his previous findings) in collaboration with 
Leng, Cao, and Davalos (2011) explored long-term performance and failure risk of firms cited 
in the AAERs. Their study examining 239 penalized firms found “significantly negative 
abnormal stock returns in up to three years following AAERs” and noted negative operating 
performance during this period. This 2011 study found that “average 1-year, 2-year, 3-year 
abnormal returns after the AAER month are -12.97%, -23.68%, and -26.02%, respectively.” 
Therefore, declines in shareholder wealth are even more severe in the years following an 
AAER; the immediate drop in stock price is not normally recovered. Leng et al. conclude that 
“ignoring the long-term stock price impact can substantially underestimate the economic 
penalty the stock market imposes on AAER firms.” Leng et al.’s work also considered 
implications regarding failure risk. Clearly, a declining stock price and increased costs of 
capital can strain a company’s financial resources; SEC fines and reputational damage stem 
from the AAER. Failure, for the purpose of this study, was bankruptcy and/or delisting from a 
major stock exchange. The researchers found that “the failure rate of the AAER firms 
(28.45%) is almost twice as high as that of the non-AAER firms (14.64%). The findings 
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suggest that there are not only immediate, negative consequences of financial reporting 
violations and investigations, but also lasting repercussions concerning a company’s 
survivability.  
 
Accounting misstatements and fraud are still prevalent in a post-SOX financial world. The 
short- and long-term consequences of AAERs are significantly negative, so what motives for 
earnings manipulation continue to trump integrity and transparency in corporate governance? 
A study by Elayan, Li, and Meyer (2008) grapples with this question. The first and most 
central reason is that the companies are not performing well. This can lead to earnings 
manipulation primarily in the form of revenue-inflating in desperate, unethical firms. Elayan 
et al. examined earnings per share (EPS) statistics for firms with accounting violations 
compared with firms without these improprieties. They found that the median EPS for 
wayward firms was $0.57 versus a median EPS of $0.90 for financially disciplined firms. This 
poor operating performance often has negative outcomes for stock prices, and firms with 
equity-based compensation for management can create dangerous incentives for earnings 
manipulation; this is another reason “creative accounting” sometimes trumps financial 
reporting integrity. Indeed, the same study documented that total equity-based compensation 
for firms with accounting misstatements and/or fraud was 58.1% of total compensation. This 
figure is about 13 percentage points above the equity-based compensation for firms not cited 
in AAERs. Therefore, management compensation structures more dependent upon stock 
performance seem more likely to undermine strategic, upstanding leadership and lead to 
unethical accounting decisions. Clearly, these are findings that independent auditors and SEC 
enforcement officials must keep in mind in order to be professionally skeptical in more 
precarious audit situations and to more efficiently uncover financial reporting violations.   
 
Kedia and Philippon provide a broader economic perspective in their article titled “The 
Economics of Fraudulent Accounting.” In an intriguing addition to the existing accounting 
research, the authors of this article explore the distortions in the allocation of resources, 
namely labor and investment, due to unethical earnings management. In summary, Kedia and 
Philippon explain that “managers of firms with low productivity not only manage earnings but 
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also hire and invest too much in order to mimic good managers.” This practice was 
epitomized by Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000’s. In fact, “publicly traded firms that 
restated their earnings in 2000 and 2001 lost between 250,000 and 600,000 jobs” in the period 
ending in 2002. The laborers in this example were part of an enormous fraud, and their efforts 
were much less productive, in an economic sense, than they could have been if they had been 
employed by a transparent, legitimately high-performing firm. Thus, the authors argue, 
aggregate activity in an economy is below the optimum because at all times laborers 
somewhere work for inefficient firms manipulating earnings and investors are fooled by 
financial misreporting and consequently finance these unproductive companies. Although this 
research does not address many of the macroeconomic implications, they are worth 
consideration. So while declines in shareholder wealth are evident and underscore the 
importance of discipline in both private and public accounting for capital markets there are 
also ramifications for the larger economy in terms of allocation of resources.  
 
Understanding why the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Enforcement Division targets 
certain companies is relevant because it relates to the identification of likely sources of 
potential misstatement and violations of the securities laws. SEC financial reporting probes 
and the requirements established by various federal securities laws exist to strengthen the 
foundation of the US capital markets and society’s trust in that system. In a well-developed 
securities market constantly making decisions based on the information presented by publicly 
traded companies, the independence and expertise of their auditors, the presence and 
effectiveness of the SEC Enforcement Division and SEC laws, and the resulting financial 
information circulated around the investing public need to be transparent and reliable. The 
existing literature outlined and reviewed above quantifies the impact of investigations into 
financial reporting violations before the twenty-first century. The data sources also highlight 
the notion that internal controls and transparent financial reporting cannot be taken for 
granted. Rather, adherence to GAAP and virtuous corporate governance are of critical 
importance for the operations, stock performance, and survivability of a business. 
Understanding the consequences of SEC investigations into shoddy or fraudulent accounting 
may improve discipline and morale in public and private accounting. It will also, as 
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accounting research from the past has suggested, benefit stakeholders and the economy as a 




Research Questions:  
 
1. What is the impact of a recent financial reporting-related SEC investigation on the 
stock price of the targeted company? (Timing, Direction, and Magnitude) 
2. How do shareholders in an industry competitor respond? 
3. What common violations has the SEC exposed in recent years and does the nature of 
the violation matter with regard to the companies and/or competitors? 
 
To answer the research questions outlined above, the Event Study Methodology was applied.  
Event Study 
 
An event study in essence is a statistical method applied to assess the impact of an event on 
the value of a firm. The event is specific news revealed to the investing public on a particular 
day; in this instance, the event is the disclosure of a financial reporting-related SEC 
investigation. It is not surprising that these investigations and the possibility of impending 
enforcement actions impact expectations of profit and risk concerning the targeted company 
and thus impact investor decision-making. The value of a targeted firm is measured by market 
capitalization. Since the price per share multiplied by the number of outstanding shares equals 
market capitalization, quantifying the stock price fluctuation as a result of the event provides a 
reasonable estimation of the impact of a probe on shareholder wealth. The challenge arises 
from the need to correct for broader stock market movements on and around the event date to 
isolate the event’s impact. 
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The price fluctuation of a targeted firm’s stock on its own is not particularly meaningful. The 
stock’s price could change as a result of overall movement of the broader stock market on the 
event date, not as a response to the disclosure of an SEC investigation. For this reason it is 
necessary to determine a security’s expected return if there had not been an extraordinary 
event. The magnitude and direction of this expected return depend on the degree to which the 
firm’s stock generally moves with the broader market. This sensitivity to market movements 
is reflected in the firm’s beta (β) coefficient, which once determined can be used to calculate 
the expected return of the stock given any market return. For this study the Market Model is 
used to determine each stock’s beta coefficient.  
 
Market Model: rs = α + rm β + ε 
 
Above rs is the return of the stock, α is the intercept, rm is the return of the market, β is the 
sensitivity of the stock to market returns, and ε is a random error assumed to be normally 
distributed with a mean of zero. This market model equation indicates how the return on a 
firm’s stock reflects rises and falls in the overall stock market.  
 
Again, in order to form an accurate prediction of a security’s expected return surrounding an 
event date, the market model is employed. To ultimately determine the beta coefficient with 
some accuracy, the researcher selects a 200-day measurement window over which the 
correlation between the overall market and the selected stocks is analyzed. In this study the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 stock market index (S&P 500) is used as a proxy – a baseline 
reference – for overall market movements. A regression analysis in turn provides the 
researcher with an estimation of the particular security’s sensitivity to S&P 500 index 
movements. Certain stocks generally move in a one-to-one relationship with the overall 
market; these stock would have a beta coefficient close to 1. Appendix D, a sample of raw 
event study data for Avon Products, provides an example of a calculated beta of 0.925, 
indicating that Avon’s stock generally moves in the same direction – according to the 200-day 
measurement window – as the overall market. In addition the calculated beta of 0.925 
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indicates that the magnitude of Avon’s stock movement is marginally less than that of the 
overall market on a particular day. The point is that, with the beta coefficient determined from 
the 200-day measurement window, a stock’s expected returns can be calculated in the 
identified event windows because the researcher has established the security’s normal 
correlation with the overall market.  
 
To isolate investor reaction to the event, the researcher calculates the “abnormal returns” for 
each day during the event window. The event window for this study begins 20 trading days 
before the event date and ends 20 trading days after (a total of 41 days). The research 
procedure to identify the event date, Day 0, is explained in the following section, “Research 
Process.” The expected return on each day t (ERt) over the 41-day event window is calculated 
as follows:  
ERt = α + β rm,t 
 
Where α and β are from the earlier estimated market model for each security and rm,t  is the 
actual return on the market (S&P500) on day t. 
 
An abnormal return for each day t (ARt) is then computed as follows: 
 
ARt = Rt – ERt 
 
Where Rt is the actual return to the firm on each day t. 
 
The direction, timing, and magnitude of the abnormal returns show the event’s impact on the 
value of the firm, net of expected changes resulting from market movements. The abnormal 
returns on the event date, Day 0, provide insights into the immediate stock price impact of 
particular information concerning a company. The abnormal returns on Day 0 are most likely 
to be attributable to the event and are most compelling when it comes to answering the 
aforementioned research questions. Nonetheless, to capture a general short-term context and 
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to find whether or not the event had a lasting impact, the researcher calculates cumulative 
abnormal returns over three subsequent event windows. Although the abnormal returns on 
subsequent days (Day 1, Day 2, Day 3,… Day 20) are influenced by the release of countless 
bits of new information of interest to the investing public, the results – the magnitude of 
cumulative abnormal returns over certain windows – still offer some perspective into the 
short-term impact of a significant event. The cumulative abnormal returns are calculated over 
three windows: from Day 0 to Day 2, Day 0 to Day 5, and Day 0 to Day 20. The cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated by summing the abnormal returns of the individual 
days in each window. Admittedly, there is a slightly more precise way of examining short-
term cumulative abnormal returns, but that method, referred to as compound cumulative 




The research process begins on the Securities and Exchange Commission website, specifically 
on the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases page. Many CPAs, CPA firms, and 
companies are subject to SEC enforcement actions each quarter, but the researcher is 
concerned with publicly traded entities. There are forty-six companies with requisite historical 
stock market data cited in SEC financial reporting-related enforcement releases from April 
2014 through March 2017. Five companies currently under investigation but not yet charged 
were added to the sample to gain insight into the impact of probes that may not even result in 
penalties. This underscores that the study is concerned with the date that SEC probes first 
become public knowledge.  
 
The event date is the date on which a financial reporting-related SEC investigation into a 
certain company is revealed to the public. The releases date is the date on which the SEC 
administers the enforcement action, thus concluding the investigation and outlining the 
punitive action. The event and release dates for the entire sample are shown in Appendix A. 
The process of identifying the event date involves a careful examination of media releases 
relating to the company prior to the enforcement action. Often media releases identified as the 
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first disclosure of a probe to the public occur years before the case is settled. The Wall Street 
Journal is the most dependable and recognizable news media outlet that provided the 
researcher with event dates. As discussed in the “Limitations,” the process of identifying the 
event date is not without flaws. The event dates identified can be inexact given the tendency 
of this information to leak, which one can conjecture based on examples such as Figure M, 
which charts Bank of America’s negative cumulative abnormal returns before and after the 
event date (discussed further under “Results”). Event dates can also be inexact given the 
myriad past news releases for a researcher to sift through. Nonetheless, given the statistically 
significant results reached and presented in the “Results” section one can be reasonably 
assured that many of the event dates mark major negative events for the corporations sampled.  
 
Once the event date is identified for a certain company, the publicly traded entity’s historical 
stock market data is gathered for the 200-day measurement window and the 41-day event 
window. All of the historical stock market data for the companies, the competitors, and the 
baseline reference – the S&P500 – were collected from Yahoo! Finance. The figures of 
primary interest are the adjusted close prices per share of the security, as partially illustrated 
for Avon Products in Appendix D, for each day on and around the event date. The adjusted 
close figures for the companies are then aligned with the baseline reference adjusted close 
data on the same dates. The closing prices per share for each of the 241 days are used to 
calculate the stock’s daily returns and the market’s daily returns. With the resulting returns 
statistics the researcher can, as explained in the “Event Study” section, use the market model 
to determine the stock’s beta coefficient and thus expected returns. By comparing the actual 
and expected returns during the 41-day event window, the researcher quantifies the abnormal 
returns for 20 days before the event date, the event date, and 20 days after the event date. 
Appendix C provides a summary of these abnormal returns in the event window for nine 
companies. To draw meaningful results from the sample and to answer the primary research 
question, each company’s cumulative abnormal returns in the windows described in the 
“Event Study” section are aggregated by calculating an average.  
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Industry competitors are deduced from an analysis of each company’s industry. The North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is the standard for classifying business 
entities according to primary business activities performed. Mergent Online, a global 
company database, compiles company and industry profiles. Mergent is used to look up the 
companies in the sample and sort industry competitors based on NAICS codes. From a list of 
industry rivals, main competitors of the companies are selected based on comparable sales 
revenue totals and location of central operations. Ultimately, the main competitor selection is 
often imprecise and subject to change and thus reliant on the researcher’s judgement. 
Matching companies and competitors with consideration to revenues and target markets 
lessens the inexactitude, yet identification of main competitors is still a limitation of the study. 
All companies and competitors included in the sample are shown in Appendix I. 
  
After completing the event study procedure for companies and competitors, the researcher 
examines the SEC enforcement releases and public documentation relating to the 
investigation to ascertain the primary violation and the monetary penalty amount. The 
companies and their corresponding violations as categorized by the researcher are organized 
in Appendix G. The categories of violation include overstating/understating 
revenues/expenses, bribery/ foreign corrupt practices (included as accounting violations 
because the bribes are often written off as business expenses), internal control of financial 
reporting deficiencies, general improper accounting practices (specific Non-GAAP issues), 
and widespread accounting fraud. The companies and their commensurate monetary fines and 
disgorgements of ill-gotten gains are shown in Appendix H. In addition, the companies are 
sorted by market capitalization in Appendix E. These aspects and characteristics of the 
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RESULTS 
The results are organized by companies, competitors, and consequences. The results are, for 
the most part, aggregate outcomes from the samples tested for statistical significance. 
 One asterisk (*) means “statistically significant” at the .05 level. 
 Two asterisks (**) means “statistically significant” at the .01 level. 
Companies 
On the date a financial reporting-related SEC probe becomes public knowledge, the targeted 
company earns on average negative abnormal returns of 6.13%. In effect shareholders of a 
publicly traded business subject to an SEC investigation lose on average 6.13% of their 
investment’s value on the day the investigation is revealed. Individual results – segmented 
into a few event windows – for the companies targeted are presented in Appendix B. 




The results in the three subsequent windows suggest that the probe’s impact on shareholder 
wealth is not limited to the event date; rather, the “event” has a lasting impact because the 
securities’ returns do not swiftly rebound to the expected levels. The corresponding test 
statistics (T-Stats) for the above results are presented in the following table: 
 
 
In each event window of interest, the outcomes are highly statistically significant. Based on 
the t-stats computed, one can infer with 99% confidence that the negative average cumulative 
abnormal returns for companies targeted are not due to chance.  
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The individual outcomes for Bank of America are worth further discussion for two reasons. 
First, the cumulative abnormal returns earned by the firm on and after the event date are 
illustrative of the average result for companies in this sample. Second, the cumulative 
abnormal returns earned by the firm before the event date are intriguing because information 
about the disclosure of negative information concerning Bank of America – the revelation of 
an SEC probe – appears to be leaking out before the official announcement and impacting 
investment decisions for those with inside information (Appendix M).  
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for BAC: 
 
 
The event’s impact on Avon Products is also included because of the remarkable drop on the 
date an SEC bribery probe was disclosed (Appendix N). The result is extreme compared to 
the average cumulative abnormal returns of the sample, but it illustrates the precipitous drop 
in shareholder wealth that can occur even well before a financial reporting-related 
investigation is settled. 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for AVP: 
 
 
The researcher attempts to derive further takeaways by examining the ultimate consequences 
of the probes. The researcher studies all of the enforcement releases, but separating the firms 
into several “buckets” based on the primary violation cited and the monetary penalties does 
not yield compelling results (Appendix G; Appendix H). This is likely due to the fact that the 
ultimate consequences are not known on the event date and thus the violations and the 
The Impact of Recent SEC Financial Reporting Probes on Shareholder Wealth:                           
Companies, Competitors, and Consequences 
Senior Capstone Project for Stephen Warde 
- 17 - 
penalties do not factor into shareholder responses. In addition the primary violation is based 
on the researcher’s judgement from reading the enforcement release; the violation is not 
explicitly stated.  
 
An objective firm characteristic does affect the results: size. The size of the company targeted 
in the SEC probe does matter. Here size is determined by market capitalization. For the 
purposes of this study, “Large Caps” are companies with market capitalizations of $10 billion 
or more, “Mid Caps” are those with market capitalizations between $2 billion and $10 billion, 
and “Small Caps” are those with market capitalizations of less than $2 billion. Company 
information on Yahoo! Finance is used to identify 17 firms (from the sample) as large caps, 
12 as mid caps, and 22 as small caps. Appendix E presents the sample sorted by these 
designations. Appendix F presents the largely statistically significant aggregate results.  
 
The small cap companies are impacted considerably more negatively by the SEC financial 
reporting probes than the mid cap and large cap companies. Average cumulative abnormal 
returns were statistically significant in all but one of the event windows. The large caps are 
generally just 2 to 3 percentage points below the expected returns. Meanwhile, the returns 
from small caps are on average around 10 percentage points below their expected returns. 
Each of the three company size “buckets” realizes negative cumulative abnormal returns. 
Overall the remarkably negative abnormal returns of the small cap companies bring down the 
entire sample’s average. This likely reflects a conception that large companies are established 
and relatively financially sturdy and thus an SEC enforcement action is unlikely to damage 
the viability of those businesses moving forward. Less information circulates about small cap 




The Impact of Recent SEC Financial Reporting Probes on Shareholder Wealth:                           
Companies, Competitors, and Consequences 
Senior Capstone Project for Stephen Warde 
- 18 - 
Competitors 
This study examines the relationship, in terms of shareholder wealth surrounding an SEC 
investigation, between some classic business rivals. The full list of companies and 
competitors is shown in Appendix I. In the end the results are not as compelling as the 
rivalries themselves would suggest (Appendix J and below). 
 




(Not Statistically Significant) 
 
Despite the inconclusive results above, greater variability is noted on the event date. The 
standard deviation of the competitors’ abnormal returns on Day 0 compared to the standard 
deviations on other event dates suggests that there is some sort of atypical impact on 
competitors. Although a simple average may nullify abnormal returns of opposite directions 
(positive and negative abnormal returns), the relatively higher standard deviation on Day 0 
indicates that the magnitude of abnormal returns for competitors is slightly greater on the date 
an SEC probe into a rival is revealed. Further research leads to an intriguing discussion 
regarding the United States passenger airline industry. 
 
The US passenger airline industry is a tight oligopoly. United, American, Delta, and 
Southwest perform the majority of domestic flights. The airlines are known for being 
interdependent and for having fundamentally similar strategic and operational business 
models. In fact in 2015 a US Justice Department probe with reference to possible collusion 
between the four oligopolistic competitors was revealed. Stock returns for United Continental 
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Holdings and American Airlines provide insight into company-competitor effects when 
United disclosed a financial reporting-related SEC probe in 2015. Results are shown below 




Both stocks took substantial hits and earned negative abnormal returns in the event window 
on and following the event date. Of course United, as the target of the SEC investigation and 
the eventual recipient of the enforcement action, is further below its expected returns than 
American. However, the corresponding negative abnormal returns for American are evidence 
that shareholders of American are anxious about similar violations. It shows that in certain 
instances an SEC probe can impact both companies and competitors considerably. Further 
research relating to the interplay of stock prices between companies and competitors could 
yield compelling results for other industries.  
Consequences 
Appendices G and H exhibit the primary violations and the monetary penalties, respectively, 
of each company. Bribery / Foreign Corrupt Practices is the most common primary violation, 
indicating a need for multinational corporations to perform more due diligence when 
acquiring foreign subsidiaries and to create and maintain more robust internal controls abroad. 
Deficiencies in internal controls are cited in nearly every enforcement release. The control 
environment, particularly “tone at the top,” is fundamental to a firm’s financial reporting. 
 
Monetary penalties total $909,160,972 for the 46 companies cited in enforcement actions 
during the timeframe. Penalties come in the form of civil money penalties paid to the SEC, 
profit disgorgement (relinquishment of ill-gotten gains), criminal fines, and prejudgment 
interest. Notable penalties include: Computer Sciences Corporation - $190,000,000 civil 
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money penalty to SEC; Weatherford International - $140,000,000 civil money penalty; 




This study uses accessible historic stock market data; therefore, the quantitative research 
findings will be objective and verifiable. Execution of the event study can result in error 
because of the technical Excel processes involved and the researcher’s inexperience with this 
research method. It is also important to note the inexact process involved in identifying the 
“event date” – the date when the SEC financial reporting investigations first become public 
knowledge – for the purposes of this study. The date of every financial reporting-related 
enforcement action brought by the SEC from April 2014 through March 2017 will be precise 
because that information is presented in a day-by-day list on the SEC website. However, the 
process of tracking each investigation back to the corresponding disclosure dates, the dates 
when the investigations were revealed in one way or another, is less precise and relies on the 
researcher’s examination and judgement. The SEC often performs undisclosed probes, 
leaving it up to the targeted companies or business-oriented media to disclose the 
investigations.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A – Companies Subject to SEC Investigations (2014-2017) 
 
Company  Release Date Event Date 
OSG - Overseas Shipholding Group  1/23/2017 8/9/2016 
HMST - HomeStreet Inc.  1/19/2017 1/13/2017 
OFIX - Orthofix International  1/18/2017 8/2/2016 
GM - General Motors Company  1/18/2017 3/11/2014 
MDCA - MDC Partners  1/18/2017 4/28/2015 
LLL - L3 Technologies  1/11/2017 7/31/2014 
MDLZ - Mondelez International (Kraft)  1/6/2017 2/11/2011 
BGC - General Cable Corporation  12/29/2016 9/22/2014 
JKHY - Jack Henry & Associates  12/21/2016 6/29/2015 
UAL - United Continental Holdings  12/2/2016 2/5/2015 
JPM - JPMorgan Chase & Co.  11/17/2016 8/19/2013 
FTI - FTI Consulting (FMC Tech)  10/20/2016 7/1/2014 
GSK - GlaxoSmithKline  9/30/2016 6/20/2013 
BUD - Anheuser-Busch InBev  9/28/2016 3/25/2013 
ORRF - Orrstown Financial Services  9/27/2016 7/22/2015 
WFT - Weatherford International  9/27/2016 3/2/2011 
PRK - Park National Corporation  9/21/2016 2/28/2012 
AZN - AstraZeneca  8/30/2016 3/18/2009 
ALOG - Analogic Corporation  6/21/2016 12/12/2014 
IEC - IEC Electronics  6/8/2016 5/20/2013 
CAB - Cabela's  4/26/2016 7/24/2014 
LOGI - Logitech International SA  4/19/2016 5/22/2014 
INTL - INTL FCStone  4/12/2016 12/17/2013 
NVS - Novartis AG  3/23/2016 4/26/2013 
MLNK - ModusLink Global Solutions  3/15/2016 6/11/2012 
MHR - Magnum Hunter Resources  3/10/2016 2/15/2013 
QCOM - QUALCOMM  3/1/2016 11/3/2010 
PTC - PTC Inc.  2/16/2016 7/29/2015 
SCLN - SciClone Pharmaceuticals  2/4/2016 8/10/2010 
SAP - SAP SE  2/1/2016 8/12/2015 
OCN - Ocwen Financial Corporation  1/20/2016 8/1/2014 
SMRT - Stein Mart  9/22/2015 10/22/2013 
RATE - Bankrate  9/8/2015 9/15/2014 
BK - Bank of New York Mellon  8/18/2015 1/28/2015 
CSC - Computer Sciences Corporation  6/5/2015 12/12/2013 
GT - Goodyear Tire and Rubber  2/24/2015 7/28/2011 
OPY - Oppenheimer Holdings  1/27/2015 6/6/2012 
AVP - Avon Products  12/17/2014 10/27/2011 
The Impact of Recent SEC Financial Reporting Probes on Shareholder Wealth:                           
Companies, Competitors, and Consequences 
Senior Capstone Project for Stephen Warde 
- 22 - 
CSIQ - Canadian Solar  12/15/2014 6/1/2010 
BRKR - Bruker Corporation  12/15/2014 8/3/2011 
BIO - Bio-Rad Laboratories  11/3/2014 5/5/2010 
GLDD - Great Lakes Dredge and Dock  10/27/2014 3/15/2013 
BAC - Bank of America  9/29/2014 4/28/2014 
SWHC - American Outdoor Brands 
(Smith & Wesson) 
 
7/28/2014 1/19/2010 
VISI - Volt Information Sciences  7/25/2014 11/8/2010 
CVS - CVS Health  4/8/2014 8/2/2013 
XOM - Exxon Mobil  Pending 9/16/2016 
BABA - Alibaba Group  Pending 5/25/2016 
TOSBF - Toshiba Corporation  Pending 3/17/2016 
BA - Boeing  Pending 2/11/2016 
IBM - International Business Machines  Pending 10/27/2015 
 
  
The Impact of Recent SEC Financial Reporting Probes on Shareholder Wealth:                           
Companies, Competitors, and Consequences 
Senior Capstone Project for Stephen Warde 
- 23 - 
Appendix B – Abnormal Returns for Companies Targeted 
  
 Event Date (and subsequent trading day 
windows) Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Company  Day 0 Day 2 Day 5 Day 20 
XOM - Exxon Mobil  -0.92% -2.78% -2.83% 1.84% 
BABA - Alibaba Group  -7.60% -1.08% -5.83% -3.90% 
TOSBF - Toshiba Corporation  -6.08% -2.47% 0.85% 16.35% 
BA - Boeing  -5.37% -5.52% -4.38% -1.78% 
IBM - International Business Machines  -3.71% -2.84% -2.74% -2.25% 
OSG - Overseas Shipholding Group  -7.67% -18.46% -13.88% -12.49% 
HMST - HomeStreet Inc.  -6.26% -5.64% -9.33% -19.84% 
OFIX - Orthofix International  -10.16% -11.02% -10.25% -7.34% 
GM - General Motors Company  -4.41% -5.87% -3.72% -3.53% 
MDCA - MDC Partners  -28.06% -22.79% -24.42% -23.19% 
LLL - L3 Technologies  -10.08% -10.89% -12.04% -8.78% 
MDLZ - Mondelez International (Kraft)  -1.74% -1.67% -1.49% 1.78% 
BGC - General Cable Corporation  -3.05% -12.02% -19.66% -23.88% 
JKHY - Jack Henry & Associates  0.61% 0.22% 0.29% 3.66% 
UAL - United Continental Holdings  -4.49% -11.08% -10.00% -11.64% 
JPM - JPMorgan Chase & Co.  -2.05% -2.26% -3.11% -4.77% 
FTI - FTI Consulting (FMC Tech)  -2.17% -1.52% -1.54% 1.29% 
GSK - GlaxoSmithKline  -2.47% -2.93% -2.28% -1.24% 
BUD - Anheuser-Busch InBev  -0.44% -1.27% 0.76% -1.26% 
ORRF - Orrstown Financial Services  0.35% 0.86% 3.50% 1.62% 
WFT - Weatherford International  -10.43% -14.62% -13.79% -9.38% 
PRK - Park National Corporation  -2.53% -5.01% -6.69% -6.37% 
AZN - AstraZeneca  -4.10% -4.54% -6.56% -5.48% 
ALOG - Analogic Corporation  -0.61% -3.03% -0.81% -2.08% 
IEC - IEC Electronics  -13.48% -26.69% -25.42% -30.92% 
CAB - Cabela's  2.20% 3.49% 6.87% 11.55% 
LOGI - Logitech International SA  -4.22% -0.72% -1.36% -4.36% 
INTL - INTL FCStone  -7.57% -11.54% -12.44% -10.97% 
NVS - Novartis AG  -0.10% 0.16% -1.12% -2.75% 
MLNK - ModusLink Global Solutions  -33.01% -29.34% -23.09% -20.50% 
MHR - Magnum Hunter Resources  -3.52% 1.26% 10.22% 2.98% 
QCOM - QUALCOMM  0.36% 4.17% 3.24% 4.89% 
PTC - PTC Inc.  -2.95% -6.48% -5.76% -5.75% 
SCLN - SciClone Pharmaceuticals  -28.12% -21.22% -24.63% -17.32% 
SAP - SAP SE  -0.12% -1.64% -1.71% -2.03% 
OCN - Ocwen Financial Corporation  -7.57% -10.52% -12.40% -3.96% 
SMRT - Stein Mart  -1.03% 1.34% -0.94% 0.05% 
RATE - Bankrate  -13.30% -14.17% -12.58% -18.17% 
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BK - Bank of New York Mellon  -1.57% 0.18% 0.93% 3.08% 
CSC - Computer Sciences Corporation  -0.58% -0.16% 0.56% 0.69% 
GT - Goodyear Tire and Rubber  -6.65% -4.27% -3.70% -16.44% 
OPY - Oppenheimer Holdings  -0.23% -5.33% -6.93% 3.27% 
AVP - Avon Products  -21.24% -21.42% -21.40% -22.26% 
CSIQ - Canadian Solar  -4.84% -24.89% -26.92% -11.68% 
BRKR - Bruker Corporation  -9.29% -12.35% -6.04% -8.10% 
BIO - Bio-Rad Laboratories  -6.79% -8.93% -11.91% -12.39% 
GLDD - Great Lakes Dredge and Dock  -17.70% -21.50% -20.89% -28.68% 
BAC - Bank of America  -6.67% -6.35% -6.73% -7.26% 
SWHC - American Outdoor Brands 
(Smith & Wesson)  0.21% -0.78% -0.88% 9.24% 
VISI - Volt Information Sciences  -0.80% -11.80% -17.98% -21.85% 
CVS - CVS Health   -0.72% -3.40% -3.96% -4.28% 
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Window MHR MLNK QCOM PTC ALOG IEC CAB LOGI INTL
-20 0.75% 0.52% 0.92% -0.15% -0.83% 1.40% 1.45% -7.33% 0.18%
-19 2.34% 2.60% -0.11% 0.01% 0.00% 1.39% -0.26% -0.83% 0.32%
-18 4.02% 0.83% -0.06% -0.09% -0.79% 1.15% 1.38% -2.61% 0.56%
-17 -1.51% -1.04% -1.33% 0.04% 1.43% 0.12% 1.55% 1.24% 0.01%
-16 -6.66% 2.05% 1.04% 0.21% -1.51% 4.42% -1.11% -1.93% -0.25%
-15 0.29% 1.90% 0.57% -0.12% 0.92% -0.49% 0.30% 1.11% -0.47%
-14 -1.06% -0.98% -0.34% 0.15% -1.01% -0.52% 0.84% -0.70% 0.66%
-13 -1.76% -1.68% -0.74% -5.91% 0.72% -0.50% 0.13% -1.53% -0.17%
-12 -0.24% -1.01% -1.29% -1.26% 0.32% -8.82% -0.62% -3.25% -0.08%
-11 0.31% -0.11% 0.69% -0.31% 0.91% -4.31% 0.07% -1.41% -1.50%
-10 0.68% -0.51% -0.53% 1.95% -0.38% 1.40% -1.73% 0.20% 0.23%
-9 2.09% -2.48% -1.07% -0.54% 0.06% 1.08% -1.60% -2.88% 0.65%
-8 1.49% 1.96% 0.24% -0.91% -0.52% 0.32% -2.39% 5.21% -0.11%
-7 -2.23% -0.73% 0.14% -0.04% 1.27% -1.20% -0.59% -1.11% -0.35%
-6 -2.05% -2.92% -0.90% -0.30% 0.77% 0.12% -2.49% -0.92% -0.16%
-5 -3.17% -1.37% 1.43% 1.16% 1.36% -0.15% 1.03% -1.56% 0.13%
-4 -1.55% 0.04% -0.25% -0.71% -0.47% -1.07% 1.84% -1.94% 1.19%
-3 -2.26% -1.77% 1.68% 0.32% 2.60% -0.72% -2.07% -0.70% 0.23%
-2 0.87% 0.56% 0.28% 0.26% 10.58% -0.61% -0.66% 1.34% 0.35%
-1 0.83% -0.76% -0.56% 0.16% 3.94% 0.13% -0.79% -0.17% -0.36%
0 -3.52% -33.01% 0.36% -2.95% -0.61% -13.48% 2.20% -4.22% -7.57%
1 1.78% 8.25% 4.18% -4.11% -2.40% -15.99% 1.13% 0.64% -3.16%
2 2.99% -4.58% -0.37% 0.58% -0.03% 2.78% 0.17% 2.85% -0.82%
3 5.82% -6.91% -0.94% 0.92% 1.69% 2.57% -0.11% 0.17% -2.98%
4 2.13% 19.66% 0.90% 0.03% -0.51% -2.18% 3.88% -1.00% -0.14%
5 1.01% -6.50% -0.89% -0.22% 1.04% 0.89% -0.39% 0.19% 2.23%
6 -2.09% 4.95% 0.84% -0.46% -0.28% 0.20% -1.29% -1.39% -1.24%
7 -4.35% -1.24% 0.02% -0.15% -0.43% -0.70% 0.54% 2.74% 1.06%
8 -0.50% -3.83% -1.18% 0.73% 0.44% -1.53% 1.12% 2.58% -0.26%
9 -3.54% 10.46% 0.28% 0.30% 0.07% 0.06% 0.75% -0.22% 0.19%
10 -4.33% -5.02% 3.41% -1.79% 2.39% -2.15% 0.25% -2.07% -0.47%
11 1.50% -0.24% -1.84% -0.32% -2.57% -5.47% -1.57% -0.26% 1.33%
12 0.73% -1.44% 0.27% 0.84% -0.93% -0.02% 1.87% -0.96% -0.06%
13 4.70% -2.88% -0.20% 0.80% -1.21% -0.78% -0.58% -0.27% 1.36%
14 -0.59% -3.55% 0.07% 0.39% -0.22% 0.26% -0.58% -0.45% -1.48%
15 -1.22% 2.42% 0.80% -0.01% -0.62% -1.94% 1.77% 0.95% 0.34%
16 0.24% 4.13% -0.17% -0.43% 0.76% 2.45% -1.00% -1.07% 0.38%
17 -1.64% 1.93% -0.79% 0.38% 0.05% 4.85% 1.19% -0.75% 1.04%
18 2.15% 2.23% -0.49% 1.84% 0.00% -0.17% 0.98% -1.22% -1.17%
19 1.25% -1.23% 0.47% -0.06% 0.62% -1.20% 0.55% -3.36% 3.26%
20 0.46% -4.11% 0.17% -2.05% 0.66% 0.62% 0.68% 2.75% -2.80%
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Appendix E – Companies Sorted by Market Capitalization 
 
Company Market Cap 
QCOM - QUALCOMM Large 
NVS - Novartis AG Large 
SAP - SAP SE Large 
BK - Bank of New York Mellon Large 
XOM - Exxon Mobil Large 
BABA - Alibaba Group Large 
BA - Boeing Large 
IBM - International Business Machines Large 
BAC - Bank of America Large 
CVS - CVS Health Large 
JPM - JPMorgan Chase & Co. Large 
GSK - GlaxoSmithKline Large 
BUD - Anheuser-Busch InBev Large 
AZN - AstraZeneca Large 
GM - General Motors Company Large 
MDLZ - Mondelez International (Kraft) Large 
UAL - United Continental Holdings Large 
PTC - PTC Inc. Medium 
CAB - Cabela's Medium 
LOGI - Logitech International SA Medium 
CSC - Computer Sciences Corporation Medium 
GT - Goodyear Tire and Rubber Medium 
TOSBF - Toshiba Corporation Medium 
BRKR - Bruker Corporation Medium 
BIO - Bio-Rad Laboratories Medium 
SWHC - American Outdoor Brands 
(Smith & Wesson) Medium 
WFT - Weatherford International Medium 
LLL - L3 Technologies Medium 
JKHY - Jack Henry & Associates Medium 
RATE - Bankrate Small 
MHR - Magnum Hunter Resources Small 
MLNK - ModusLink Global Solutions Small 
ALOG - Analogic Corporation Small 
IEC - IEC Electronics Small 
INTL - INTL FCStone Small 
SCLN - SciClone Pharmaceuticals Small 
OCN - Ocwen Financial Corporation Small 
SMRT - Stein Mart Small 
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OPY - Oppenheimer Holdings Small 
AVP - Avon Products Small 
CSIQ - Canadian Solar Small 
GLDD - Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Small 
VISI - Volt Information Sciences Small 
FTI - FTI Consulting (FMC Tech) Small 
ORRF - Orrstown Financial Services Small 
PRK - Park National Corporation Small 
OSG - Overseas Shipholding Group Small 
HMST - HomeStreet Inc. Small 
OFIX - Orthofix International Small 
MDCA - MDC Partners Small 
BGC - General Cable Corporation Small 
 
Appendix F – Market Caps and Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
 
Appendix G – Companies Organized by Primary Financial Reporting Violation 
 
Company Primary Violation 
QCOM Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices 
NVS Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices 
SAP Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices 
BK Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices 
XOM General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP) 
BABA General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP) 
BA General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP) 
IBM "Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue 
BAC General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP) 
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CVS "Cooking the Books" - Overstate Rev. and Understate Exp. 
JPM Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices (Hiring) 
GSK Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices (Business Expense) 
BUD 
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices (Business Expense) IC 
Deficiency 
AZN 
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices (Business Expense) IC 
Deficiency 
GM Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR) 
MDLZ 
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices (Business Expense) IC 
Deficiency 
UAL Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR) 
PTC Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices 
CAB "Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue 
LOGI General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP) 
CSC 
Wide-ranging Accounting Fraud: Manipulation of Financial 
Results 
GT Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices 
TOSBF "Cooking the Books" - Understate Expenses 
BRKR Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices 
BIO Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices 
SWHC 
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices 
WFT 
Wide-ranging Accounting Fraud: Manipulation of Financial 
Results 
LLL "Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue 
JKHY "Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue 
RATE "Cooking the Books" - Overstate Rev. and Understate Exp. 
MHR Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR) 
MLNK "Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue 
ALOG Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices 
IEC "Cooking the Books" - Understate Expenses 
INTL Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR) 
SCLN Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices 
OCN Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR) 
SMRT General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP) 
OPY General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP)* 
AVP Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices 
CSIQ "Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue 
GLDD Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR) 
VISI "Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue 
FTI "Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue 
ORRF General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP) 
PRK "Cooking the Books" - Understate Expenses 
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OSG Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR) 
HMST General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP) 
OFIX 
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices (Business Expense) IC 
Deficiency 
MDCA General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP) 
BGC Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR) 
 
Appendix H – Companies and Monetary Penalties 
 
Company Penalty 
QCOM $7,500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
NVS 
$21,579,217 Profit Disgorgement; $1,470,887 Prejudgment Interest; $2,000,000 Civil 
Money Penalty to SEC 
SAP $3,700,000 Profit Disgorgement; $188,896 Prejudgment Interest 
BK 
$8,300,000 Profit Disgorgement; $1,500,000 Prejudgment Interest; $5,000,000 Civil 





BAC $7,650,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
CVS $20,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
JPM 
$72,000,000 Criminal Fine; $105,507,668 Profit Disgorgement; $25,083,737 Prejudgment 
Interest 
GSK $20,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
BUD 
$2,712,955 Profit Disgorgement; $292,381 Prejudgment Interest; $3,002,955 Civil Money 
Penalty to SEC 
AZN 
$4,325,000 Profit Disgorgement; $822,000 Prejudgment Interest; $375,000 Civil Money 
Penalty to SEC 
GM $1,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
MDLZ $13,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
UAL $2,400,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
PTC 
$14,540,000 Criminal Fine; $11,858,000 Profit Disgorgement; $1,764,000 Prejudgment 
Interest 
CAB $1,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
LOGI $7,500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
CSC $190,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
GT $14,122,525 Profit Disgorgement; $2,105,540 Prejudgment Interest 
TOSBF Pending 
BRKR 
$1,714,852 Profit Disgorgement; $310,117 Prejudgment Interest; $375,000 Civil Money 
Penalty to SEC 
BIO $35,100,000 Profit Disgorgement; $5,600,000 Prejudgment Interest 
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SWHC 
$107,852 Profit Disgorgement; $21,040 Prejudgment Interest; $1,906,000 Civil Money 
Penalty to SEC 
WFT $140,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
LLL $1,600,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
JKHY $780,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
RATE $15,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
MHR $250,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
MLNK $1,600,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
ALOG 
$3,402,000 Criminal Fine; $7,672,651 Profit Disgorgement; $3,810,311 Prejudgment 
Interest 
IEC $200,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
INTL $150,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
SCLN 
$9,426,000 Profit Disgorgement; $900,000 Prejudgment Interest; $2,500,000 Civil Money 
Penalty to SEC 
OCN $2,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
SMRT $800,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
OPY 
$4,168,400 Profit Disgorgement; $753,471 Prejudgment Interest; $5,078,129 Civil Money 
Penalty to SEC 
AVP $52,850,000 Profit Disgorgement; $14,515,013 Prejudgment Interest 
CSIQ $500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
GLDD $150,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
VISI No Monetary Penalty for Company 
FTI $2,500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
ORRF $1,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
PRK $500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
OSG $5,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
HMST $500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
OFIX 
$2,928,000 Profit Disgorgement; $263,375 Prejudgment Interest; $2,928,000 Civil Money 
Penalty to SEC 
MDCA $1,500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
BGC $6,500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC 
 
Appendix I – Companies and Competitors 
 
Company Industry Competitor 
QCOM - QUALCOMM DISH - Dish Network 
NVS - Novartis AG ROG - Roche Holding 
SAP - SAP SE ORCL - Oracle Corp. 
BK - Bank of New York Mellon USB - US Bancorp 
XOM - Exxon Mobil CVX - Chevron Corporation 
BABA - Alibaba Group AMZN - Amazon.com 
BA - Boeing EADSY - Airbus Group SE 
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IBM - International Business 
Machines ACN - ACN, Inc. 
BAC - Bank of America JPM - JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
CVS - CVS Health WBA - Walgreens Boots Alliance 
JPM - JPMorgan Chase & Co. BAC - Bank of America 
GSK - GlaxoSmithKline AZN - AstraZeneca 
BUD - Anheuser-Busch InBev CABGY - Carlsberg A/S 
AZN - AstraZeneca GSK - GlaxoSmithKline  
GM - General Motors Company F - Ford 
UAL - United Continental Holdings AAL - American Airlines 
PTC - PTC Inc. CA - CA Inc. 
CAB - Cabela's DKS - Dick's Sporting Goods 
LOGI - Logitech International SA SNX - Synnex Corp. 
CSC - Computer Sciences Corporation LDOS - Leidos Holdings 
GT - Goodyear Tire and Rubber BRDCY - Bridgestone Corporation 
TOSBF - Toshiba Corporation SU.PA - Schneider Electric SA 
BRKR - Bruker Corporation BIO - Bio-Rad Laboratories 
BIO - Bio-Rad Laboratories WAT - Waters Corp. 
SWHC - American Outdoor Brands 
(Smith & Wesson) NPK - National Presto Industries 
WFT - Weatherford International BHI - Baker Hughes Incorporated 
LLL - L3 Technologies RTN - Raytheon 
JKHY - Jack Henry & Associates CIEN - Ciena Corp. 
RATE - Bankrate MLNK - ModusLink Global Solutions 
MHR - Magnum Hunter Resources LINEQ - Linn Energy 
MLNK - ModusLink Global Solutions RATE - Bankrate 
ALOG - Analogic Corporation TER - Teradyne 
IEC - IEC Electronics PKE - Park Electrochemical Corp. 
INTL - INTL FCStone MS - Morgan Stanley 
SCLN - SciClone Pharmaceuticals SPPI - Spectrum Pharmaceuticals 
OCN - Ocwen Financial Corporation LEN - Lennar Corp. 
SMRT - Stein Mart CTRN - Citi Trends Inc. 
OPY - Oppenheimer Holdings IBKR - Interactive Brokers Corp. 
AVP - Avon Products EL - Estee Lauder 
CSIQ - Canadian Solar BGC - General Cable Corp. 
GLDD - Great Lakes Dredge and Dock AEGN - Aegion Corp. 
VISI - Volt Information Sciences NSP - Insperity Inc. 
FTI - FTI Consulting (FMC Tech) MMS - MAXIMUS Inc. 
ORRF - Orrstown Financial Services CCNE - CNB Financial Corp.  
PRK - Park National Corporation FFBC - First Financial Bancorp 
OSG - Overseas Shipholding Group CKH - SEACOR Holdings 
HMST - HomeStreet Inc. WAFD - Washington Federal Inc. 
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OFIX - Orthofix International SNN - Smith & Nephew 
MDCA - MDC Partners IPG - Interpublic Group of Companies 
BGC - General Cable Corporation BDC - Belden Inc. 
 








Appendix L – Passenger Airline Industry Example 
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Appendix M – Bank of America Chart of Abnormal Returns 
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